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Abstract—Developing countries have embarked on the promo-
tion of “ICT access for all” through subsidized Information and
Communication Technologies (ICTs), especially in underserviced
areas of such countries. The main aim of the “ICT access for
all” is to extend the communication services to the large areas
of underserviced regions through subsidized communication
services. In some instances, subsidies may lead to high ICT
penetration and high resource utilization while in some instances
unsubsidized services may lead to low utilization of resources and
low ICT penetration, which may eventually lead to market failure
and destroy market efficiency. With explicitly defined objectives,
regarding subsidy policy, however, developing countries always
fall short on the implementation of such subsidy policy due to
economic reasons and unrealistic subsidy driven pricing models.
In this paper we investigate the impact of subsidy driven pricing
model on resource utilization and revenue maximization in a
developing country. In this paper we try to find a middle ground
between promoting “ICT access for all” (given a subsidy and
diverse income variations between the groups) and resource
utilization in a network.
Index Terms—Pricing, Developing country, Subsidy, ICTs
I. INTRODUCTION
IN developing countries the amount and characteristicsof consumers of ICT services affect revenue, quality of
service (QoS) and have substantial financial and business
model implications for providers and consumers alike [4]. On
the whole, competitive environments with numerous service
providers are more likely to offer lower costs, high QoS,
and are more inclined to create and adjust to a dynamic
communications environment. On the other hand, monopolistic
service providers who are common in developing countries are
inclined to serve large urban areas, and are reluctant to enter
smaller and rural markets where there is little or no possibility
to derive a profit. To that effect, governments of developing
countries have required and persuaded such monopolistic
suppliers to serve rural areas through a combination of service
requirements and subsidies [3] [5] [8], but have had limited
success in creating competitive rural markets. In much of
the developing world, therefore, rural access remains limited
in scope, regularity, and quality. New entrants typically give
precedence to the profitable urban markets, and may enter
rural areas and underserviced regions with infrastructure that
is insufficient for effective service provision. This observation
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has led to the exclusion of underserviced areas or rural
communities from the urban areas in terms of ICT access.
The exclusion of rural communities and underserviced areas
from ICT resources in developing countries perpetuates the
problems associated with socio-economic deprivation (specif-
ically poverty). Thus, most rural and underserviced areas
in developing countries lack access to basic ICT services,
creating a gap between the information “haves” and “have
nots”[4] [7] [8].
The gap between the information “haves” and “have nots”
creates a group of customers whose preferences and socio-
economic status are very diverse. This heterogeneity can
arise from economical imbalances due to poverty (income
disparity) or from different geographic locations or both [12].
To effectively rectify the existing inequalities in access to ICT
services, governments of developing countries use different
economic mechanisms, commonly funded by taxes.
The current practice in such countries has been to promote
information access by means of tiered subsidized pricing
scheme. However, in countries where technical expertise is
still in its embryonic stages, subsidized pricing schemes have
proved to be very difficult to implement, and, in certain
cases, it is unclear whether the user’s threshold values and
sensitivities towards price are taken into consideration [10].
Subsidy driven pricing mechanisms have, often times, resulted
in controversies and may on certain occasion led to resource
tragedies in such countries
In a heterogeneous society (especially in developing coun-
tries), subsidized resource use can lead to the tragedy of the
(anti) commons [12]. If too large a subsidy is given, consumers
will demand more than is available creating the tragedy of the
commons [6]. In order to prevent the tragedy of the commons,
service providers and government policy makers have to cut
the subsidy level which will eventually reduce the number
of consumers. The decrease in the number of consumers
(especially rural consumers) may then lead to the tragedy of
the anti-commons [1], leaving a gap in government policy and
objectives of promoting social and economic growth. In such
an eventuality, the government will have to lower the prices yet
again, via a subsidy, in order fulfill their objectives, creating
a see-saw effect.
In order to prevent this tragedy of the (anti) commons in
the telecom markets, a correct subsidy enhanced price structure
must be developed for such a market. The use of the correct
subsidy level to promote ICT access in underserviced areas
can be seen as a balanced two tier-pricing scheme (taking
into consideration customer sensitivities and price thresholds).
Furthermore, it can be seen as a means of preventing the
tragedy of the (anti) commons and at the same time promoting
social and economic growth. By setting up the right subsidy
(an equilibrium subsidy) mechanism, to induce a desirable
number of users, the service providers and government can
achieve the optimal utility. In this paper, we study the impact
of subsidies on the network resource usage by the information
“have nots” and propose a subsidy driven pricing model that
will mitigate the tragedy of the (anti) commons. We study all
the possible outcomes of the subsidy on the information “have
nots” and find a fair solution that will prevent the underusage
or overusage of network resources by the subsidized group.
This paper is organized as follows: In section II we propose
our pricing model describing all the necessary mathematical
concepts and formulas, and in section III we evaluate how
subsidies affect user usage in a heterogeneous society, in
section IV we develop our revenue maximizing equation and
propose a new class of mechanisms for addressing the tragedy
of the (anti)commons problem that arises in the usage of
subsidy so as to promote social and economic growth in
underserviced areas. Section VI concludes our study.
II. PRICING MODEL
We consider a case of a developing country with hetero-
geneous consumers and an observable income disparity or
geographical disadvantage; the information “haves” (N2) and
“have-nots” (N1). In heterogeneous societies, such as South
Africa and Zambia, consumers have different service require-
ments and sensitivities towards price. In such developing coun-
tries, service providers can offer different charging standards
for each consumer and can choose a suitable price based on
consumers’ price acceptance, sensitivities and threshold values
towards a set price and adjust their price accordingly so as to
obtain an optimal price at which a both types of consumers
will be more willing to pay for the service. Such characteristics
can be learned through a market price adaptive research which
estimates the threshold values of users and sensitivities in
such an environment. In fact, the process of learning price
parameters in such a market is a dynamic process with the
aim of adjusting the quoted price in line with the consumers’
behavior towards price dynamics.
Within this current perspective, we assume that the N1
consumers are offered a subsidy so as to promote social and
economic growth in underserviced areas, while the N2 users
pay the price that is set by the services provider. We take p1
and p2 as the price that is payable to the service provider
by the heterogeneous consumers N1 and N2, respectively,
where p1 = βp2, where β is a subsidy factor and is in the
range of 0 < β < 1 and p2 ∈ (0, p∞) while c and λ is the
cost of providing network services. The following definition
is required.
Definition 1 The threshold or reserve price, pthi for i ∈ (1, 2)
is the price at which a customer from group i is indifferent
between subscribing to the current network or opting out of
the current network. 2
Assuming that pthi for i ∈ (1, 2) is the reservation price, the
consumer’s utility function can thus be written as u(pthi,pi) for
i ∈ (1, 2). If pthi − pi > 0 the consumers has positive utility,
if pthi − pi < 0 then the consumer has a negative utility.
For notational simplicity we assume that consumers attempt
to maximize their utility subject to the reservation price of
pth1 for N1 and pth2 for N2, where pth1 < pth2 < p∞.
III. TRAGEDIES AND RESOURCE UTILIZATION IN
HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES
Depending on the subsidy level, the total number of in-
formation “have nots” will increase or decrease leading to
the tragedy of the commons or tragedy of the anti-commons
respectively. We define the following:
Definition 2 The tragedy of the commons is a dilemma arising
from the situation in which consumers, acting independently
and rationally consulting their own self-interest, will ultimately
deplete a shared limited resource, even when it is clear that it
is not in anyone’s long-term interest for this to happen [6].2
Definition 3 The tragedy of the anti-commons, describes a
coordinated breakdown in a game where the existence of high
prices for a public good or numerous holders of certain rights
hinder the achievement of more socially desirable outcome
[1]. 2
In developing countries, it is obvious that pricing struc-
tures that are currently at use affect network usage and are
not helping in promoting social and economical growth. To
that effect, subsidy driven pricing may be a valuable tool
in promoting social and economic growth in underserviced
regions of developing countries. From the users’ point of view,
price affects their behavior in terms of network usage, which
is correlated to their perception about the price for such a
service. Therefore, choosing the right price and subsidy by
the service provider and government respectively, is of great
importance in maximizing revenue and preventing resource
tragedies. It is therefore imperative that government policy
makers and service providers find a middle ground between
“ICT access for all” and resource overuse or underuse given
a subsidy β and users’ reservation price i.e. pth1 and pth2.
In underserviced regions of some developing countries the
reservation price is associated with a number of factors.
Primarily, any heterogeneous user is assumed to maximize his
or her utility subject to a predetermined level of his or her
income or reservation price [2]. Some of the probable factors
associated with users’ reservation price in developing countries
are what is perceived as positive or negative utility experienced
by the consumer. For example, for people who live on less than
USD 2 a day [4], pricing the internet services beyond such an
amount, i.e. USD 2, will constitute what is known as a negative
utility towards the customer or consumer. To remove such a
negative utility, a subsidy has to be paid by the government to
the ISP. However, such a subsidy may have an adverse effect
on resource usage, number of users and revenue maximization
in a network.
To understand the impact of subsidies on user behavior
and revenue maximization in developing countries, especially
on the information “have nots”, one has to understand how
subsidies affect the number of users subscribing to an ISP. The
number of users in this case determines the revenue and the
number of packets sent in any network. For example, Figure
1 and Figure 2 shows a relationship between packets and
price given a government subsidy factor β = 0.1, β = 1,
sensitivity α = 0.1, λ = 100, pth1 = 40 and pth2 = 100.
Analysis of the graphs shows that the number of packets seem
to fluctuate with increasing or decreasing subsidy factor β.
For instance, for a subsidy factor of 0.1, as in Figure 1, the
number of packets increases significantly due to an increase in
the number of users, while the opposite is true for no subsidy
(β = 1). Obviously, there is an elastic relationship between
price and the number of users that will enable us to make some
generalized observations about the entire information “have
nots” population. We list these observations as below:
• There exists a finite price p1 > pth1 where a customer
will not subscribe to any ISP.
• Information “have nots” are rational, they will prefer a
subsidized price or a lower price to a higher price.
• The number of information “have nots” who will accept
a given price in any heterogeneous communities of de-
veloping countries does not increase with price.
Given the above motivation, we can therefore define the num-
ber of packets for the N1 and N2 in a network as a function
of price p1 and p2 and the reservation price pth1 and pth2
respectively. Jagannathan and Almeroth [13] and Li et al [14]
investigate user behavior upon price change using a demand
function model. We adopt this model with some modifications
to reflect our price setting and the number of users. When the
price tends to zero the number of users increases significantly
and when the price is very high the number of users decreases
significantly. The following equations are given for the number
of N1 and N2 users and number of packets in a network
accordingly:
N1 =
(
βp2
pth1
)−α
− 1 (1)
N2 =
(
p2
pth2
)−α
− 1 (2)
Combining equations (1) and (2) and multiplying with λ
will give us the total number of packets in a network:
Totalpackets = λ
(
βp2
pth1
)−α
− 1 + λ
(
p2
pth2
)−α
− 1 (3)
Where 0 < α ≤ 1 is the probabilistic response of consumers
towards price, and it increases with an increasing value of
α. Actually, α can be described as the perceived utility of
consumers given a certain price. From equation (3) we can
define the unused capacity for the network by subtracting
number of packets from the total network capacity.
IV. SUBSIDIES, TRAGEDIES AND REVENUE MAXIMIZATION
IN HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETIES
When a consumer uses shared resources in a network, that
consumer should pay a corresponding price. The dynamics of
correct subsidy implementation in a heterogeneous community
Fig. 1. Number of packets versus the price at different subsidy levels
Fig. 2. Unused network capacity versus the price at different subsidy levels
(Network capacity = 45 for N1 and N2)
could affect the individual user’s (in this case the information
“have nots”) decision in such a way that tragedy of the
commons and tragedy of the anti-commons can be avoided.
Given the preferences of consumers for a given price p2 and
a cost c, the profit function of the service provider can be
written and defined as follows:
Π = λ
((
βp2
pth1
)−α
− 1
)
(p2 − c)
+λ
((
p2
pth2
)−α
− 1
)
(p2 − c) (4)
Taking the partial derivatives of 4, we obtain an expression
of Π as follows:
∂Π
∂p2
=
λ
( βp2pth1 )
α − 1 +
λ
( p2pth2 )
α − 1+
λα(c− p2)
pth2(
p2
pth2
)α+1
+
λαβ(c− p2)
pth1(
βp2
pth1
)α+1
(5)
Further differentiation of equation (5) provides us with:
∂2Π
∂p22
= −
(
2λα
(pth2
p2
pth2
)α + 1
)
−
(
2λαβ
(pth1
βp2
pth1
)α + 1
)
−
(
λα(c− p2)(α+ 1)
(p2th2(
p2
pth2
)α+2
)
−
(
λαβ2(c− p2)(α+ 1)
p2th1(
βp2
pth1
)α+2
)
(6)
A close analysis of equation (4), (5) and (6) shows that there
is an optimal solution (price) to equation (4) that provides the
service provider with the maximum revenue or profit. Thus,
from equation (4), (5) and (6) the following theorem can be
proposed:
Theorem 1 Suppose the profit function Π is twice differen-
tiable and strictly concave in the region 0 < p2 < pth2, then
there exists an optimal price p∗2 that maximizes the service
provider’s revenue due to unsubsidized users. 2
Proof: From equation (4), (5) and (6) we see that ∂Π∂p2 = 0
has a maximum point since ∂
2Π
∂p22
< 0, meaning that within the
interval of 0 < p2 < pth2, the profit function is positive for
all the values of p2 in ci < pi < pthi. Therefore, it is clear
that the profit function, Π, is strictly concave in the region
of ci < pi < pthi for i ∈ 1, 2. Moreover, it can be inferred
from Equation (4) that if ∂
2Π
∂p22
< 0, Π contains at least one
maximization point or fixed point (see Kakutani fixed point
theorem), at which ∂Π∂p2 = 0 within the range of c < p2 <
pth2. Thus the optimal price can be found by equating the
first derivative to zero i.e. ∂Π∂p2 = 0 and solving for p
∗
2.
Depending on the price set by the ISP, and within the range
of 0 ≤ p1 ≤ pth1, the number of information “have-nots”
in such a network can be determined by the value of the
subsidy β set by the government. Actually, β also determines
the maximum profit that the ISP can receive under no network
capacity constraints i.e. the assumption of infinite available
bandwidth. From theorem (1), we provide the following lemma
to support our claim:
Lemma 1 In any developing country the maximum number
of information “have nots” (N1) subscribing to an ISP is
determined by the subsidy factor β, and is a maximum when
β ≈ 0 i.e. p1 ≈ 0 2
Proof: Consider equation 3 as follows:
Ntotal =
(
βp2
pth1
)−α
− 1 +
(
p2
pth2
)−α
− 1,
by differentiating equation 3 with respect to β we obtain:
∂N
∂β
=
αp2(c− p2)
pth1
βp2
pth1
(α+1)
. (7)
From ∂N∂β , we can solve for β
∗ by equating 7 to zero:
β =
(
αp2(c− p2)
pth1p
(α+1)
2
) 1
(α+1)
(8)
It is clear from the lemma that if β∗ ≈ 0 then the tragedy
of the commons is the most likely outcome. Increasing the
value of β such that β∗ = 1, will reduce the number of
information “have nots” subscribing to the ISP. Obviously, a
solution to equation (8) exists that maximizes the revenue of
a service provider without creating the tragedy of the (anti)
commons within the range 0 < β < 1. Since the solution
to the equation above is mathematically intractable, we use
Matlab to approximate the value of β which is the solution to
equation (8). Note that this solution is dependent on the value
of the threshold values for the two groups and it varies with
varying threshold and sensitivity (α) towards price.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we provide the simulation results on the
consequences of subsidy on the number of users and revenue
maximization. We use Matlab to approximate our solutions.
A. Effect of subsidy on revenue and price
In Figure 3, 4 and 5, we evaluate the effect of subsidy on
revenue maximization, given any price p2 and the threshold
price of consumers i.e. pth1 and pth2 at a constant sensitivity
α. Figure 3, for example, shows that for a subsidy factor of
β = 1 (in this case we assume that the government does not
subsidize the information “have nots”), the revenue generated
from the information “have nots”, is, actually, dependant on
the maximum price pth1 that they are willing to pay. This
phenomenon, especially in underserviced areas of develop-
ing countries, may sometimes result in the tragedy of anti-
commons since very few information “have nots” will be
willing to subscribe to the ISP. For all intents and purposes,
it is worthwhile to note that the information “haves nots”
are contributing very little towards the ISP’s overall revenue
since no subsidy is being given by the government towards
the ISP (see Figure 3). In order to obtain maximum revenue
from the users, it will be meaningful for the ISP to charge the
information “have nots” and “haves” an optimal price of 30
units so as to maximize revenue.
Consider again that the government subsidizes the infor-
mation “have nots” as shown in figure 4. Figure 4 shows
that too much subsidy has a drastic consequence on revenue
maximization and the number of information “have nots”
subscribing to an ISP. Since decreasing the subsidy factor
β, i.e. β = 0.1,increases the number of information “have
nots”, it is obvious that the maximum revenue obtained by
the ISP will be highest when the government pays for all the
“information have nots”(β ≈ 0) as shown in Figure 4.
In actual fact, Figure 4 represents an outcome that will
objectively fulfill government policies of universal access for
all, as it allows for more information “have nots” to subscribe
to the ISP at a subsidized price. However, such a situation
would definitely promote the tragedy of the commons and may
lead to market failure in once stable markets. Thus, Figure 4
highlights the implications of heavy subsidy towards revenue
maximization in a heterogeneous society, and shows that under
heavy government subsidy there will be a skewed information
Fig. 3. Revenue versus price at alpha = 0.3 pth1 = 40 pth2 = 100 β = 1
c = 10
Fig. 4. Revenue versus price at alpha = 0.3 pth1 = 40 pth2 = 100
β = 0.1 c = 10
Fig. 5. Revenue versus price at alpha = 0.3 pth1 = 40 pth2 = 100
β = 0.4 c = 10
access between the information “haves” and the information
“have nots” due to unequal subsidy distribution.
By equating (consider equation 4) the revenue generated by
the information “have nots” to the “information haves” we can
solve for equilibrated value of β. Figure 5, actually, represents
an equilibrated game between the information “haves” and
“have nots” as the revenue curve of the N1 and N2 follow
the same trajectory. Both users (as depicted in Figure 5) will
not subscribe to the ISP at the price of 100 units preventing
free riding. Contrary to Figure 3 and 4, Figure 5 represents
a desirable outcome between the information “haves” and
“have nots” as it represents a balanced price versus revenue
curve trajectory. Generally, Figure 5, in point of fact, may
prevent the tragedy of the commons and tragedy of the anti-
commons in heterogeneous society as no member of a group
is disadvantage due to skewed pricing.
B. Revenue, subsidy and consumer sensitivity towards price
This section presents results on how β and the sensitivity α
affects revenue maximization given the two groups of people.
We adopt the following values for our simulation: pth1 = 40
λ = 2 c = 10 pth2 = 100.
Fig. 6. Revenue versus beta and alpha when p2 = 15
Fig. 7. Revenue versus beta and alpha when p2 = 40
In this subsidy driven pricing model, understanding the
properties of subsidy factor β and sensitivity α, is useful
to ascertain revenue maximization. The major question to be
asked in this pricing model is: how does customer sensitivity α
and subsidy factor β affect the revenue obtained by the service
provider given the threshold price of the consumer pth1 pth2?
As observed from Figure 6, 7 and 8, revenue maximization is
affected by the value of the subsidy factor and sensitivity of
consumers towards price.
The figures show that by adjusting the value of α and β the
government and the ISP can attain a required number of users
so as to prevent the tragedy of the commons and the tragedy of
anti-commons. As a matter of analysis, Figure 6, 7, 8 expresses
the revenue as a function of β and α that determines and
optimizes net revenue over the ISP’s services horizon.
Fig. 8. Revenue versus beta and alpha when p2 = 90
VI. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the effect of subsidy on the increase
and decrease of users in a network which has a direct effect
on the underuse and overuse of resources in heterogeneous
communities. We have shown that if implemented properly,
subsidies can prevent the tragedy of the (anti) commons and
could be the solution to promoting social and economical
growth in developing countries. In a matter of fact, developing
countries must consider the trade off between increasing or
decreasing subsidy and its effect on the underuse or overuse
of resources. Our subsidy driven pricing model addresses
the importance of a balanced subsidy pricing scheme with
a view of achieving social and economical growth while
enhancing the usage of network resources efficiently. Using
this framework, we have shown that a government subsidy
ina developing country can result in the increase or decrease
of information “have nots” leading to the tragedy of (anti)
commons. We have also shown that a correct subsidy, given
customer sensitivities, can promote desired revenue and that
the revenue is a concave function of price.
We have derived the optimal revenue given the price,
subsidy factor β and α as shown in the Figures of 6, 7 and
8. In summary we have shown that an over-subsidized or
under-subsidized group of users in a heterogeneous society
can lead to either the tragedy of commons or anti-commons
accordingly.
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